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A THOMISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN DEATH1 
Jason T. Eberl 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 1968, with the published report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical 
School,2 many scholars and medical practitioners began to abandon the traditional cardio-
pulmonary criterion for determining when a human being has died and to argue that, since the 
brain is the central organ which regulates the body’s metabolic functions, irreversible cessation 
of the functioning of the brain as a whole—cerebral cortex, cerebellum, and brain stem—
constitutes death.  This “whole-brain” criterion of death is based on the understanding that a 
human organism cannot function as a unified whole without a functioning brain.3   
 The general acceptance of whole-brain death led to the postulation that perhaps not every 
part of the brain need irreversibly cease functioning in order for death to occur.  Some scholars 
recognized that the so-called “higher-brain” functions of the cerebral cortex are responsible for 
the peculiarly human “personal” activities of conscious rational thought and volition.  Hence, an 
argument is made that the death of a human person occurs when her cerebral cortex has been 
rendered irreversibly non-functional.  This “higher-brain” concept of death is used as the basis to 
argue that patients in an irreversible permanent vegetative state [PVS] are no longer persons and 
thus should be considered dead.   
 In what follows, I will review higher-brain and whole-brain death from the standpoint of 
Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical understanding of human nature.4  I will critique arguments for 
higher-brain death being a proper interpretation of Aquinas’s views and make a case for whole-
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brain death to be compatible with Aquinas’s account of human death given current biological 
data.  I will begin with a brief account of what Aquinas explicitly states about death. 
AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT OF HUMAN DEATH 
 Aquinas’s account of a human being’s death begins with his understanding of a rational 
soul5 as a human body’s substantial form and its unitive function as such:  “the body is united by 
the soul; a sign of which is that, when the soul departs, the body is dissolved.”6  As the 
substantial form of a human body, a rational soul is the principle of the body’s (1) existence 
(esse), (2) unified organic functioning, and (3) specific nature as a “human” body.7  Aquinas 
asserts (1) and (2) in the following passages: 
“To live” is said in two ways.  In one way, it is the very existence of a living 
thing, which results from a soul united to a body as form.  In the other way, “to 
live” stands for the operation of life.8    
 
“To live” stands for the operation of the soul which it produces in the heart 
insofar as it is a mover . . . and it infuses this life first in the heart, and afterwards 
in all the other parts [of the body].9 
 
Aquinas understands a rational soul to be the principle of a human body’s organic 
functioning and to operate by means of a primary organ.10  Aquinas, following Aristotle, 
identifies the primary organ as the heart; though contemporary science would identify it as the 
brain.  Rendering a human body’s primary organ as the brain, as opposed to Aquinas’s explicit 
reference to the heart, is warranted by the criteria Aquinas gives for considering the heart as the 
primary organ.  First, Aquinas describes the primary organ as that through which the soul 
“moves” or “operates” (operatur) the body’s other parts.  Second, he describes the primary organ 
as the “ruler” of the body’s other parts in the sense that it orders them as a ruler orders a city 
through laws.11  Third, he cites the dependence of the body’s other parts upon the primary 
organ.12  Now the brain, according to the contemporary understanding unknown to Aquinas, 
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functions as the source of operation for a body’s vital autonomic and voluntary functions, 
regulates such functions and orders them to support the body’s holistic-level existence and 
activity, and is the critical organ upon which the body’s other vital organs—including the heart 
and lungs—depend for their functioning.  I thus contend that the brain best satisfies Aquinas’s 
description of the primary organ and thereby warrants substituting it for the heart in Aquinas’s 
account.          
 Aquinas’s two understandings of life entail two understandings of death: 
Since death is the loss of life, it must be similarly distinguished so that it 
designates at one time the loss of that union by which a soul is united to a body as 
form, and at another time the loss of the operation of life.13   
 
Though he separates two understandings of the term “death” with respect to human beings, 
Aquinas nevertheless considers them united in one and the same event.  When the union of a 
rational soul and its body is dissolved, the dissolution of the body’s unified organic functioning 
immediately follows: 
If that which holds the individual contrary parts14 together is removed, they tend 
toward what is fitting to them according to nature, and thus the dissolution of the 
body is brought about.15 
 
 Aquinas understands death to occur because a pre-mortem human body is not perfectly 
informed by its rational soul.  As a result, material defects can arise in the body that may make it 
unsuitable for being informed by a rational soul.16  Such defects result in a body’s unsuitability 
for having a rational soul as its substantial form through its becoming unable to actualize the 
soul’s vegetative capacities: 
Although the soul, which is the cause of life, is incorruptible, yet the body, which 
receives life from the soul, is subject to change; and through this it withdraws 
from the disposition according to which it is suited for the reception of life.  And 
thus the corruption of a human being occurs.17 
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Just as form does not come into matter unless the matter is made proper through 
the requisite dispositions, so, with the cessation of the requisite dispositions, a 
form cannot remain in the matter.  And in this way the union of soul18 and body is 
dissolved; if natural heat and moisture and others factors of this sort [i.e., vital 
metabolic factors] are removed, insofar as by these a body is disposed toward 
reception of a soul.19   
 
 Aquinas thus links a human being’s death, defined as a rational soul’s separation from the 
body it informs, with the body’s no longer being able to actualize the soul’s vegetative 
capacities.  The clinical criterion for determining the occurrence of this event is the loss of vital 
metabolic functioning as evidenced by, according to Aquinas, the cessation of respiratory 
activity: 
If breath is subtracted, the union of soul20 to body fails; not because breath is the 
medium [of the union], but because the disposition is removed through which the 
body is disposed toward this union.21 
 
 Having established Aquinas’s explicit account of human death, I will now proceed to 
outline the contemporary debate between higher-brain and whole-brain death.  Illuminating this 
debate is key insofar as a properly Thomistic account of human death may end up differing from 
Aquinas’s explicit account as contemporary biological data is taken into account to determine 
when a human being’s rational soul separates from her material body and the body corrupts.  
HIGHER-BRAIN DEATH 
 The higher-brain concept of death defines the end of a human person’s biological 
existence in terms of the loss of “the capacity to think, feel, be conscious and aware of other 
people.”22  The criterion for establishing the loss of this capacity is the irreversible cessation of 
neocortical, i.e., higher-brain, functioning.  Thus, Robert Veatch concludes, “a person should be 
considered dead when there is an irreversible loss of higher brain functions.”23  Some scholars 
advocate higher-brain death as a direct interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of human 
nature.  Their argument is based upon the Thomistic principle that the presence of a specific type 
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of form in a particular material body can be asserted only by observation of the operations, or the 
inherent capacity for such operations, that are peculiar to that type of form in that body.  Thus, 
since the form of a human being is a rational soul, the capacity for conscious rational thought 
being peculiar to that type of soul, only by observation of the capacity for conscious rational 
thought in a particular body can one assert that such a body is informed by a rational soul and 
thus constitutes a human being. 
Aquinas claims that conscious rational thought does not occur by means of a bodily 
organ;24 as, say, sight occurs by means of the eyes and visual cortex.  However, Aquinas’s claim 
does not preclude there being a correlation between rational activity and neural activity; as long 
as the correlation is not explained in terms of a relation of identity or reduction of the former to 
the latter.25  Allowing such a correlation makes plausible the coherence of Aquinas’s account of 
human nature with contemporary neurobiological data.  Given the evident correlation between 
rational operation and cerebral functioning, it seems reasonable to conclude that irreversible loss 
of cerebral functioning implies the loss of the capacity for rational operation while a human 
being remains embodied.  Due to this implication, it appears to follow that one cannot assert that 
a rational soul informs the body of a PVS patient. 
 Hence, D. Alan Shewmon, arguing from a Thomistic standpoint concludes that 
irreversible loss of cerebral functioning entails the loss of a rational soul as a body’s substantial 
form.26  This construal of death involves a reversal of the “succession of souls” Aquinas holds to 
occur in human embryogenesis.27  A human being is informed by a rational soul until her body 
becomes structurally insufficient to support the soul’s definitive rational capacities.  While 
Aquinas understands the mind28 not to function through a bodily organ, he nevertheless asserts 
that the operation of a rational soul’s sensitive and imaginative capacities, which do function 
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through bodily organs, is required to provide the mind with its proper object of thought while a 
human being is embodied.29  Thus, the loss of higher-brain functioning, which neurobiological 
evidence indicates is required for imaginative operation and is correlated with rational activity, 
precludes rational activity while the soul informs a material body.30  At the loss of higher-brain 
functioning, then, it appears that a substantial change occurs in which the rational soul separates 
from the body and a sensitive or vegetative soul is instantiated as the body’s substantial form—
depending upon whether any sensitive capacities remain in the still living body.  The body is 
thus no longer identical to the body which constituted the human being insofar as it has a 
different substantial form and a substance’s persistent identity requires that it be informed by the 
same substantial form.31  The body continues to be informed by at least a vegetative soul until it 
reaches a point of deterioration where it can no longer structurally support vital metabolic 
functions.  At this point, the vegetative soul is annihilated, the body ceases to exist as an organic 
whole, and it is reduced to a mere collection of basic elements.  
 Shewmon thus concludes: 
The moment the brain cells in the hemispheres . . . become irreversibly damaged, 
the body is rendered incompatible with the human essence [i.e., rationality], 
forcing a substantial change.  The spiritual [i.e., rational] soul departs and a 
vegetative soul is actualized, which had been virtually present all along in the 
vegetative aspects of the original human soul.32 
 
In summary, then, the minimum sufficient condition for the death of a person is 
the irreversible destruction of those parts of the brain necessary for the properly 
human functions of the spiritual [i.e., rational] soul, namely intellect and will.33  
 
 E.-H. Kluge also argues for a higher-brain death interpretation of Aquinas, though he 
attempts to derive his conclusion directly from Aquinas’s texts by noting passages in which 
Aquinas appears to separate the personal death of a human being, through the loss of rational 
capacities, from the biological death of a living body.34  For example,  
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For existing things are prior to living things and living things to human beings, 
because, if human being is removed, it does not follow that animal is removed.35 
 
If the difference by which things are different from each other is removed, they 
remain the same; just as, if rationality were taken away from human being, he 
would remain among the number of irrational animals.36 
 
If that which is in something as in a subject is removed37 . . . that in which it was 
remains; but not if that which is in something as part of its essence is removed.  
For instance, if rational is removed, human being does not remain.38 
 
Aquinas even plainly states:  “For a dead human being differs from a living human being in that 
he is without sensation [i.e., conscious awareness].”39 
 As compelling as these passages appear in supporting Kluge’s interpretation, I 
nevertheless find the interpretation flawed and Kluge misconstruing the meaning of these 
assertions when taken out of context.  It is evident in all the above passages that Aquinas is 
referring to logical distinctions among species and genera.  Thus, when Aquinas asserts that an 
animal remains if rationality is removed from a human being, he is not offering an ontological 
description of what happens in the process of human death.  Rather, he is claiming that, if one 
mentally abstracts the concept of rationality from the definition of a human being, the concept of 
animality will yet remain.  Aquinas’s point here is to show how being an animal does not entail 
being rational; if such were the case, then all animals would be persons.  The same conclusion 
goes for the concepts of being alive and being rational; something can be living without being a 
person.  This conclusion, however, is arrived at with respect to the universal natures of different 
types of beings.  Aquinas’s concern is how different specific and generic categories can exist as 
logically distinct components of a single nature; e.g., the categories of existence, life, animality, 
and rationality compose the definition of a human being.  Nothing about these passages refers to 
actual metaphysical distinctions among types of being within an individual human being.  
Aquinas does not say, “Remove rationality from this human being, and she will remain as a 
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living animal no different ontologically from any other non-rational animal.”  Rather, Aquinas is 
best understood as saying in these passages, “Logically abstract the concept of rationality from 
the definition of a human being, and the concepts of life and animality will remain, thereby 
rendering the definition of a human being no different from that of any other species in the 
animal genus.”   
Aquinas explicitly speaks in this manner in another passage:  “in the abstraction which is 
made according to the universal and the particular, that from which the abstraction is made does 
not remain; for, when the difference of rationality is removed from human being, human being 
does not remain in the intellect, but only animal.”40  Aquinas refers here to logical distinctions 
among universal natures made by the mind and not to ontological distinctions among different 
stages of an individual substance’s existence.  Additionally, while Aquinas is certainly correct in 
asserting that “a dead human being differs from a living human being in that he is without 
sensation,” this assertion does not imply that the loss of sensation is the only difference between 
the dead and the living.  If such an implication were Aquinas’s intention, then he contradicts 
himself and is plainly wrong; for there are many differences Aquinas notes between the nature of 
a dead and a living human being.  Therefore, this singular assertion cannot be taken to imply that 
Aquinas holds the loss of sensation to be sufficient for a human being’s death.   
Aquinas’s meaning is made clear when the isolated passage is put in its proper context.  
In the passage at issue, Aquinas is commenting on Aristotle’s response to the question of 
whether a human being can be happy only at death when she is no longer subject to evil or 
misfortune.  Affirming Aristotle’s response, Aquinas recognizes first that a dead human being 
differs from a living human being by lacking sensation.  Thus, it would seem that a dead human 
being is happy, because she can no longer sense, i.e., be conscious of, any further evil or 
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misfortune.  Aquinas and Aristotle note, though, that even the dead can suffer the evils of a 
dishonored memory or misfortune visited upon their descendants; similarly, the living can suffer 
such evils without being aware of them.  For example, someone may slander me behind my back 
while I live and continue to do so when I am dead.  From the context, it is clear that Aquinas is 
focusing upon one particular way in which the dead differ from the living to make a specific 
point, and not defining a necessary and sufficient criterion for asserting that a human being is 
dead.       
As noted above, acceptance of higher-brain death, from a Thomistic standpoint, requires 
one to argue that when a body is no longer able to provide the biological foundation necessary 
for conscious rational thought, a substantial change occurs in which the rational soul separates 
and the body becomes informed by either a sensitive or vegetative soul.  If this is what indeed 
occurs in cases of PVS, then the body on the bed is a “humanoid animal” or perhaps a mere 
“vegetable”: 
In naturally occurring cases of persistent vegetative state, in spite of rather 
complex brainstem functions, the person is still dead, having left behind a cadaver 
informed by a vegetative soul.41        
 
This purportedly Thomistic account of human death suffers from three serious flaws.  
First, as argued above, Kluge misconstrues the passages upon which he bases his interpretation 
of Aquinas.  Second, the account is at odds with Aquinas’s explicit contention that it is a body’s 
inability to actualize a rational soul’s vegetative capacities which signals the soul’s separation 
from it; a PVS patient retains the intrinsic activity of spontaneous respiration and other vital 
metabolic functions.  The higher-brain account involves an unwarranted separation of a soul’s 
rational capacities from its sensitive and vegetative capacities.   
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Aquinas holds that a human being’s proper capacities do not begin to exist in a 
developing human embryo at the same time; the vegetative capacities are actualized first, then 
the sensitive capacities, and finally the rational capacities which signal the existence of a human 
being (see note 27 for references).  Nevertheless, once a rational soul is instantiated as the 
substantial form of a human body that has developed sufficiently, it alone possesses all of a 
human being’s proper capacities:  vegetative, sensitive, and rational.  It is not the case that there 
are three souls informing a fully developed human body.  Rather, the vegetative soul that first 
informs a living human embryo is annihilated once the embryo develops to the point where it has 
sense organs and sufficient neural development for sensitive operations; it thus becomes 
informed by a sensitive soul that has both sensitive and vegetative capacities.  The sensitive soul 
is annihilated once the point is reached where neural development is sufficient to support rational 
operation and a rational soul is instantiated that has vegetative, sensitive, and rational capacities.  
Aquinas argues at great length that a human being’s proper capacities have their source in one 
substantial form:  a rational soul.42   
Given Aquinas’s strong contention of the unicity of a human being’s substantial form, it 
is not surprising that he does not characterize human death in the same way that he does human 
generation.  Once a rational soul begins to inform a properly disposed human body, the body 
must lose its disposition for all the soul’s proper capacities in order for the separation of soul and 
body to occur.  Accepting the higher-brain interpretation entails the following metaphysical 
description of how human death occurs:  There exists first a rational substance informed by a 
rational soul, and then possibly a non-rational animal substance informed by a sensitive soul, and 
finally a merely living substance informed by a vegetative soul before its final transformation 
into a lifeless corpse.  This description violates Ockham’s Razor, which states that ceteris 
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paribus the simplest explanation of a given phenomenon—i.e., the explanation that is the least 
metaphysically complex by requiring the postulation of the least number of entities—is the 
explanation to which one ought to give assent.       
Finally, aside from the metaphysical determination of when death occurs, higher-brain 
death is epistemologically problematic for two reasons.  First, it is extremely difficult to 
determine accurately which structures of the brain are correlated with rational activity and when 
such structures become irreversibly non-functional.  In fact, there are a number of cases in which 
PVS patients have been misdiagnosed.43  A significant example is Patricia White Bull, a New 
Mexico woman who awoke from a sixteen-year coma after being diagnosed as “permanently 
vegetative” three different times.44  Second, while Aquinas notes that one can determine the 
presence of a certain capacity based upon observation of its corresponding activity,45 it does not 
follow that the lack of observation of an activity entails the lack of its corresponding capacity.  
Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that a PVS patient does not have any rational capacities only on 
the basis of not having observed her performance of any rational activity or correlative neural 
activity. 
 Due to these difficulties with a higher-brain interpretation of Aquinas’s account of death, 
I contend that a more plausible, properly Thomistic approach is to argue that the separation of a 
human being’s rational soul from her body does not occur until the body ceases to function as a 
unified, integrated organism.  A rational soul is not only the seat of a human being’s rational 
capacities; it is also the substantial form of a human body and is thereby the source of its 
sensitive and vegetative capacities.  While PVS patients may no longer be able to actualize their 
rational or sensitive capacities, their souls remain embodied and are active in terms of their 
vegetative capacities.  A human being exists before death as a composite of a rational soul and an 
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organic body, and is not identified with merely the exercise of rational capacities.46  Hence, we 
cannot be certain that a PVS patient does not remain a human being—and thereby a person—
until there is incontrovertible evidence that her rational soul has altogether ceased to be active as 
the substantial form of her body.  Irreversible cessation of higher-brain functioning may serve as 
evidence that a soul’s rational capacities can no longer be actualized while it remains embodied, 
and one may wish to infer from this evidence that the rational soul has ceased to be that body’s 
substantial form.  Such an inference, however, is invalid insofar as the remaining vegetative 
operations present in a PVS patient serve as evidence that her rational soul remains active as her 
body’s substantial form due to the soul’s vegetative capacities still being actualized in that body.   
Aquinas’s explicit statements regarding a human being’s death indicate that he takes the 
cessation of vital metabolic functioning to be the proper evidence that a rational soul has ceased 
to inform a particular human body.  It may be the case that a proper Thomistic understanding of 
death, when viewed in the light of contemporary biological data, may end up differing in its 
conclusion from Aquinas’s explicit account.  The arguments supporting a higher-brain death 
interpretation of Aquinas’s account are not conclusive and thus do not persuasively demonstrate 
that this interpretation is a proper contemporary rendering of Aquinas’s account.  I will now 
show that whole-brain death serves as a sufficiently plausible interpretation of Aquinas’s view in 
the light of the current biological understanding of death and has the virtue of avoiding the 
radical departure from Aquinas’s explicit assertions required by the higher-brain interpretation. 
WHOLE-BRAIN DEATH 
The whole-brain criterion of death has its roots in an understanding of death being related 
to an organism as a whole.  As James Bernat puts it: 
My colleagues and I have defined death as the permanent cessation of functioning 
of the organism as a whole.  “The organism as a whole” is an old biological 
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concept47 that refers not to the whole organism (the sum of its parts) but to that set 
of vital functions of integration, control, and behavior that are greater than the 
sum of the parts of the organism, and that operate in response to demands from 
the organism’s internal and external milieu to supports its life and to maintain its 
health.  Implicit in the concept is the primacy of the functional unity of the 
organism.48 
 
Bernat goes on to define the “critical functions” of an organism as a whole, the cessation of all of 
which is necessary and sufficient to constitute the loss of an organism’s functional unity: 
Critical functions of the organism as a whole comprise three distinct and 
complementary biological categories: 1) vital functions of spontaneous breathing 
and autonomic control of circulation; 2) integrating functions that assure 
homeostasis of the organism . . . and 3) consciousness . . . The critical functions in 
all three categories must be permanently lost for the organism to be dead.  
Correlatively, the presence of any of the three elements constitutes sufficient 
evidence for life.49 
 
As I will show, Bernat’s description of what is necessary and sufficient for death is consonant 
with Aquinas’s understanding of human nature. 
 Bernat’s three categories of critical functions that define the existence of an organism as a 
whole can be collectively termed the organism’s “integrative unity.”  From a Thomistic 
standpoint, a human being’s integrative unified existence involves the existence of a human body 
informed by a soul that has rational, sensitive, and vegetative capacities.  Clearly, a soul’s 
rational and sensitive capacities correspond to Bernat’s reference to consciousness.  Furthermore, 
it is reasonable to correlate Bernat’s vital and integrating functions with a soul’s vegetative 
capacities.  I thus propose that the Thomistic concept of death involves the irreversible loss of a 
human being’s rational, sensitive, and vegetative capacities.  This understanding of death is 
advocated by Thomists Philip Smith50 and Benedict Ashley51 in agreement with the Pontifical 
Academy of Sciences’ Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship 
to Human Death (10-14 December, 1989):  “A person is dead when there has been total and 
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irreversible loss of all capacity for integrating and coordinating physical and mental functions of 
the body as a unit.”52 
In Thomistic terms, when integrative unity has been irreversibly lost, a body is no longer 
proportionate for rational ensoulment; for it can no longer materially support a soul’s proper 
capacities in a unified substance: 
As the source of life and the single organizing principle of the body, the soul not 
only enables the person to breath, circulate blood, think, choose, etc., but it also 
unifies these diverse activities into an integrated whole or system.  When the soul 
separates from the body at death, the remaining organism is deprived of its 
internal unity and its radical capacity for human actions.  Thus, human death . . . 
[is equated] with the death of the organism as a whole.53 
 
 Ashley argues that the cessation of whole-brain functioning constitutes death based upon 
the principle that a rational soul “moves” the heterogeneous parts of its body through a primary 
organ:  “physical life can exist only when the principal part of the total organism maintains its 
integrative unity by providing its highest and most specific function, both exists and operates at 
least minimally.”54   
 An additional reason for holding the whole-brain criterion of death is that it defines death 
in terms of the one organ that is directly correlated with all of a human being’s proper capacities:  
vegetative, sensitive, and rational.  Shewmon asserts the following: 
The vast literature on “brain death” reveals two basic schools of thought regarding 
the essence of human death:  loss of integrative unity of the body and loss of 
specifically human properties [i.e., the capacity for conscious rational thought and 
volition].  If the intellectual soul is indeed the substantial form of the body, these 
two aspects ought to converge to one and the same pathophysiological event.  I 
take this conceptual unity to be as fundamental an axiom as either separate notion, 
so that convergence of the two approaches could be used as a kind of litmus test 
for formulations of death.55 
 
I find this “fundamental axiom” to have value insofar as it disallows the distinction favored by 
some scholars between “personal death” and “biological death.”56  Ashley also adopts this axiom 
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as it serves to define the loss of all of a human being’s proper capacities as coinciding in a single, 
empirically-verifiable event:  the cessation of whole-brain functioning.57 
 Whole-brain death consists of the cessation of all three sets of critical functions Bernat 
defines as individually sufficient for the existence of a living human organism.58  Furthermore, 
since these critical functions correspond to the Thomistic understanding of a soul’s vegetative, 
sensitive, and rational capacities, I conclude that the irreversible cessation of whole-brain 
functioning59 constitutes a human being’s death from a Thomistic standpoint and can be 
understood as the event which indicates a rational soul’s separation from the body it informs.60 
CONCLUSION 
 My aim in this article has been to develop a proper Thomistic understanding of the end of 
a human being’s embodied existence—the possibility of post-mortem bodily existence aside.61  
Such an understanding involves the determination of when a rational soul can be asserted as the 
substantial form of a particular human body.  The evidence supporting this assertion is the 
body’s having vegetative, sensitive, and rational capacities or activities.  I conclude that the 
presence of a primary organ through which integrative vegetative functioning is exercised, and 
thus a human body’s organic/substantial unity is achieved, signals that the body is informed by a 
rational soul.  Evidence that the brain functions as the integrative foundation for its body’s 
vegetative and sensitive operations, as well as being correlated with rational operation, motivates 
the understanding of it as a fetal, infant, and adult human body’s primary organ.  Therefore, the 
cessation of both a brain’s rationally-correlated and biologically-integrative functioning indicates 
a rational soul’s departure as a particular human body’s substantial form.  The whole-brain 
criterion is thus sufficient for the determination of when a human being has died. 
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 What significance does this understanding of human death have with respect to clinical 
practice and public policy?  In other words, what normative conclusion follows from the claim 
that the proper criterion of death, from a Thomistic metaphysical standpoint, is the cessation of 
whole-brain functioning?  The whole-brain criterion has become a widely accepted standard for 
the determination of death (see note 3).  However, it has not become a universal standard.  Japan, 
for instance, though it legally permits use of the whole-brain criterion as of October, 1997, 
restricts its use to “certain clearly specified circumstances”62 and the issue remains a source of 
contention there.  Adherents of Orthodox Judaism also generally reject the whole-brain criterion 
based on the Scriptural reference to God “breathing” life into Adam and respiration thus being 
the primary indication of a human being’s existence.63  The issue is currently under debate, 
though, and certain rabbis and Jewish scholars have begun to advocate whole-brain death.64 
 Based on the lack of universal consensus regarding acceptance of whole-brain death, 
certain legislatures, such as the state of New Jersey, have adopted a policy of declaring whole-
brain death as the standard—or default—criterion for determining death, but include a 
“conscience clause” whereby individuals, such as Orthodox Jews, may have their desire 
respected that the traditional circulatory/respiratory criterion be used to clinically establish their 
own death.65  Robert Veatch proposes that such a clause is not only good policy, but also should 
be expanded to allow individuals to have respected their desire to be declared dead when their 
higher-brain functions have irreversibly ceased.66  The whole-brain criterion, or any concept or 
criterion of death for that matter, would be normative only insofar as it is so for an individual of 
a particular religious or philosophical persuasion.  While whole-brain death is a reasonable 
default, according to Veatch, to be used when there is no expressed or reasonably presumed 
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desire on a patient’s part for an alternative criterion to be utilized, it should not be imposed as a 
standard for determining death for all individuals.   
 Both the whole-brain and circulatory/respiratory criteria are argued to follow from the 
same concept of death for human beings; namely, that a human being dies when her body ceases 
to function as an organism with integrative unity.  Higher-brain death, however, involves a 
distinct concept of death in which a human being dies when she ceases to exist as person, 
defined as a self-conscious rational entity by higher-brain death advocates.  This understanding 
of human personhood is not Aquinas’s,67 who links a human person’s death with the death of the 
organism that constitutes her.  While I contend that Aquinas would accept the whole-brain 
criterion, it does not strike me as objectionable that an individual be free to request, explicitly or 
presumptively, that the traditional criterion be used in her case insofar as both criteria follow 
from the same metaphysical understanding of human nature and the relationship of a human 
person to her body.  It is only with respect to the question of whether the cessation of whole-
brain functioning is sufficient for the loss of a human organism’s integrative unity that there is 
debate between these two criteria. 
 Higher-brain death, however, involves a completely different metaphysical understanding 
of human nature that is not Thomistic.  Does my conclusion, then, apply only to those who 
accept Aquinas’s view or Roman Catholics whose general philosophical viewpoint is largely 
shaped by Aquinas’s thought?  The answer to this question depends upon whether the rationale 
underlying Aquinas’s position regarding human death is theologically or philosophically based.  
If it is the former, then the principle of religious freedom and tolerance would limit the 
normative applicability of Aquinas’s position to those who share the relevant theological 
premises.  In the account described above, though, no appeal is made to theological premises.  
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Aquinas’s view of death and the interpretation I offer are based upon potentially universalizable 
philosophical premises regarding human nature.  One can thus argue that the Thomistic position 
is universally applicable and concepts of death based upon alternative philosophical 
understandings of human nature are not valid options for clinical practice and public policy; 
higher-brain death would be an example of such.  Of course, an effective argument for the 
normative applicability of the Thomistic metaphysical view of human death requires an appeal to 
a compatible moral theory to move it from being a view that may be universally applicable to a 
view that should be universally applied as a limit on admissible clinical practices and public 
policies regarding when a human being is to be properly declared dead.68                  
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